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Summary: This paper provides a state-of-the art review of the literature on European identity and 
on citizens attitudes to Cohesion policy. It is the first research paper in the COHESIFY project, 
which aims to assess the impact of Cohesion policy on citizens support for and identification with 
the European Union. The paper beings by examining the European identity literature distinguishing 
conceptual perspectives, methodological approaches, controversies and explanations. It then 
reviews the literature on the impact of EU Cohesion policy on citizens attitudes to the EU and 
related studies of Cohesion policy communication. Building on these different strands of literature, 
the final section sets out the analytical framework for the COHESIFY project including the 
conceptual approach, research design, case selection rationale and methodology.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
The European Union (EU) requires citizens support and identification to enhance its legitimacy. The 
question of whether and how much European identity is necessary for European integration is 
highly contested, largely because it is connected to controversial normative debates about the 
nature of the EU as a polity. What is clear is that the politics of European identity in Europe has 
become more salient following the recent economic and migration crises which have fuelled a rise 
in nationalist and anti-EU sentiment across Europe and exposed deep divisions among 
governments and citizens about the value, purpose and future of the EU  most strikingly evident in 
the Brexit referendum vote in the United Kingdom. EU institutions have made it a priority to 
reconnect with European citizens (Juncker 2014) through participatory, decentralised and creative 
communication about the EU (Committee of the Regions 2014). But this is a challenging task given 
the EUs territorial diversity and the lack of systematic and robust knowledge about how specific EU 
policies impact on citizens attitudes and identity and what communication mechanisms would best 
serve the re-connection with citizens.  
This is the context for the COHESIFY research project which aims to assess the contribution of EU 
Cohesion policy to a positive identification with the European integration project in terms of a 
valued, popular sense of European identity and to determine the implications for EU strategies for 
communicating EU Cohesion policy to citizens. EU Cohesion policy  can be considered a most-likely 
case for developing a sense of community because it is the EUs most explicit and visible 
expression of solidarity and has a direct impact on peoples daily lives. It provides funding to all 
European regions, especially less less-developed regions and countries, through investments that 
aim to raise economic and social prosperity and improve citizens quality of life. Its multi-level 
governance model is meant to have a key role in mainstreaming EU policy agendas to national and 
regional levels bringing the EU closer to citizens through programmes that reflect regional and local 
development needs and challenges, and which are designed and implemented in partnership with 
local authorities, non-governmental organisations, socio-economic partners and other bodies 
representing civic society.   
Yet, there are basic questions about the extent of knowledge and awareness of the policy among 
citizens across the EU, whether it is perceived to impact on their daily lives, which factors are 
influential in shaping perceptions and how this translated into attitudes to and identification with 
the EU in different regions and localities. Further, it is unclear to what extent the strategies of EU 
institutions, Member States and Managing Authorities for communicating Cohesion policy are 
effective in increasing awareness or influencing perceptions and identity. 
The central purpose of this paper is to set out an analytical framework for investigating the impact 
of Cohesion policy on European identity. It proceeds in three steps. The starting point is a review of 
the literature on European identity in terms of the key conceptual perspectives, methodological 
approaches, controversies and explanations. The second section reviews the literature on the 
impact of EU Cohesion policy on citizens attitudes to the EU and evaluations of the communication 
of Cohesion policy. Building on these different strands of literature, the final section sets out the 
analytical framework for the COHESIFY project including the conceptual approach, research design, 
case selection rationale and methodology. 
                                                                   
1 We acknowledge helpful comments and contributions by Viktoriya Dozhdeva and Dr Arno Van der Zwet, both of EPRC. 
2 Cohesion policy is used as an abbreviation for EU cohesion, regional and urban policies. 
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2. The state-of-the-art 
 
2.1 Europe an ide ntity  re se arc h: a growth fie ld in EU studie s 
 
The relationship between European integration and identity has been a central theme in European 
studies scholarship since its foundation in the late 1950s. However, it was not until the 1990s that it 
became the object of sustained and rigorous theoretical and empirical research in the context of the 
relaunch of European integration, increasing politicisation of European affairs, and a new scholarly 
interest on the impact of the EU on political attitudes and identity.  The following section reviews 
the state-of-the art of European identity research beginning with the concept of European identity 
and then turning to measures, explanations and methodological issues. 
Conceptualising European identity  
European identity is a contested and fluid concept that has been central to EU integration 
scholarship since its very foundation (Risse 2001; 2005). In Karl Deutschs transactionalism theory 
on political integration, the attainment of a sense of community among the public in terms of 
mutual loyalties and we-feelings was conceived to be a critical precondition for European and 
international integration in security communities in the post-war era (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). Key 
to the strengthening of this sense of community, according to Deutsch and his colleagues, was 
intensified communication through personal contacts and social interactions among citizens across 
different countries. The neofunctionalist theory of European integration by Ernst Haas (1958) took a 
more top-down view insofar as the formation of a collective European identity was conceived to be 
an outcome of European integration. Haas (1958) even defined integration as a shift in loyalties 
from nation-states to the European level of decision-making, although the empirical focus of his 
work was primarily on political actors (governments, parties and interest groups) rather than 
societal actors (citizens).  
More refined conceptualisations of European attitudes and identity emerged in the 70s informed by 
wider developments in political science. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) put forward a typology of 
support for Europes would-be polity distinguishing between levels of interaction and types of 
support. Drawing heavily of David Eastons political systems framework, the two main types of 
support were utilitarian and affective. While utilitarian support for the community was based on 
perceived and objective benefits of Europe, affective support was based on diffuse and emotional 
responses to European ideals. The second theoretical distinction in terms of levels of interaction 
was between an identitive dimension referring to horizontal interactions among citizens from 
different countries, in line with Karl Deutschs transactionalist perspective; and the systemic level 
relating to vertical interactions between the European system and the public, as stressed in Haas 
neo-functionalist theory.  
Conceptually, European identity was therefore understood to be a component of more general 
attitudes towards European integration. However, research on European citizens attitudes during 
the 1970s and 1980s using Eurobarometer data (notably by Ronald Inglehart) tended to conflate 
political support for the European Community with European identity despite being distinct 
concepts (Green 2000; Bellucci et al. 2012). Moreover, most of the empirical research on European 
attitudes and identity-related issues in the 1970s and 1980s focused on socialisation dynamics 
among European elites working in Brussels rather than citizens in the Member States (reviewed in 
Pollack 1998).  
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European identity research expanded rapidly in the 1990s drawing on more diverse conceptual and 
methodological approaches from across the social sciences (e.g. Smith 1992; Soledad Garcia 1993; 
Meehan 1993; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Delanty 1995; Laffan 1996; Risse et al. 1999; Risse and 
Maier 2003; Brewer et al. 2004; Bruter 2005; Sanders et al 2012, amongst others). This surge in 
scholarly interest was largely a response to the increased salience of the EU after the re-launch of 
European integration through the Single European Market programme and Treaty reforms that 
greatly increased EU decision-making power and codified provisions on EU citizenship. These 
developments provided EU institutions with stronger potential to Europeanise Member State 
policies, polities and politics, while increasing the politicisation of European affairs and ending the 
so-called permissive consensus of passive support for the EU among citizens. As a consequence, 
European public opinion and identity research placed greater attention on how Europe reshapes 
identity within Member States, the extent to which individuals identify themselves as Europeans, 
and their attitudes towards the EU and the integration process.  
Conceptual advances have been facilitated by the cross-fertilisation and mainstreaming of 
European identity scholarship in wider social science theories, particularly from sociology but also 
anthropology, history and philosophy. Social identity and self-categorisation theories from social 
psychology (Turner 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1982 Tajfel 1982) provide the conceptual building blocks 
for much of the contemporary literature on European identity (e.g. Risse et al. 1999; Medrano 2001, 
Risse 2001; 2010, Hermann et al 2004; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Bellucci et al 2012; Fligstein 
2009a/b; Kuhn 2015). Social identity research has been especially influential in developing 
understanding: of the key dimensions of identity (cognitive, affective and evaluative); of how 
identities are derived (from perceived membership qualities of groups and their comparison against 
other out-groups); and of the prevalence of multiple identities. 
Distinguishing between the cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions of identity is useful to 
avoid some of the pitfalls of conceptual overstretching found in much of the identity literature 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The cognitive dimension refers to whether people categorise 
themselves (identify) as European or not.  The evaluative dimension relates to the defining content 
that underpins this categorisation - the civic and cultural/ethnic distinctions being the most 
prevalent in EU identity research (discussed further below). The affective dimension relates to the 
emotional significance (the we-feeling) attached to collective identity. This does not imply that all 
identity dimensions need to be simultaneously present to qualify as a collective identity. For 
instance, a German or Italian may recognise that they are European (cognitively) without having an 
emotional (affective) attachment to Europe or the EU.  
Another conceptual theme derived from social identity theory is the recognition of the multiplicity 
of territorial identities and their interactions, as reflected in the distinction between crosscutting, 
nested and separate identity models (Hermann and Brewer 2004). In the latter model, identities can 
be separate if the individuals in different identity groups do not overlap. By contrast, the 
crosscutting model foresees overlaps in the members of identity groups but not for all individuals, 
e.g. not all members of an ethnic group may identify with their nation and/or Europe. In the nested 
(or Russian dolls) model, smaller collective identities are part of larger ones, e.g. local identities are 
subsumed in national identities, and national identities within European identities. A further 
blended (or marble cake) model has been added suggesting that different identities can be 
intertwined so much that it is would be difficult to separate them as implied by the nested and 
crosscutting models (Risse 2004).  
An important implication is that European identity should not necessarily be conceived as being in 
competition with national identity as part of a zero-sum identity game (Smith 1992; Waever 1995; 
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Marks 1999; Marcussen et al 1999; Risse et al. 1999; Castano 2004; Citrin and Sides 2004; Risse 
2010; cf. Carey 2002). Rather, multiple identities can co-exist in harmony and even mutually 
reinforce each other. It is increasingly recognised that European identity can be seen as 
complementing rather than replacing or conflicting with national and regional identities.  
Identifying the content of European identity is not straightforward. The common identity reference 
points that have been critical to identity formation within nation states are absent or less salient in 
Europe - a common language, cultural geography and territorial symbolism, historical memories, 
myths and traditions, religion, ethnicity or outsider groups (Smith 1992). While there is no 
commonly agreed definition or conceptualisation of European or national identity, there is a broad 
consensus that the presence of an other is an indispensable part of the identity concept (Kaina 
2013). Just as out-groups are central to identification in social identity theory, classic texts on 
nationalism and territorial identities have long been concerned with notions of othering (Gellner 
1983; Anderson 1996; Smith 1986). All identities are based on the similarity to some people and 
difference (perceived or actual) from others (Hjerm 1998: 357), but the extent to which identities 
are able to accommodate differences varies. Despite critiques of oversimplification (Kuzio 2002; 
Nieguth 1999; van der Zwet 2015; Guibernau 2007), the standard binary model first developed by 
Kohn (1944), which distinguishes between civic (inclusive) and ethnic (exclusive) identities, remains 
influential (Ignatieff 1993; Keating 1996; Greenfeld 1992; Brubaker 1996).  
In the European context, European identity is often presented as having a strong civic component in 
terms of shared political rights, but lacking an ethnic dimension that defines itself against others 
(Garcia 1993; Meehan 1993; Howe 1994). In a similar vein, Habermas argues that a European 
identity must rest on constitutional patriotism, a form of civic identity emphasising democratic 
citizenship as the integrative force. By contrast, Smith (1992) emphasises the cultural foundations 
of European identity. His notion of a family of cultures accepts cultural variations in identity 
reference points across Europe, but points to partially shared and overlapping cultural and political 
traditions (e.g. romanticism, roman law, parliamentary democracy, humanism and classicism) that 
could provide the basis for the formation of a trans-European identity in the long-term, although he 
is sceptical of the prospect.  
There is increasing recognition that multi-dimensional conceptualisations of European identity are 
more useful and accurate on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Bruter 1995; Segatti 2016). For 
instance, Bruter (1995) incorporates both the civic and cultural components. The civic component 
concerns citizens identification with the EU as a relevant institutional framework in their lives - 
which defines some of their rights, obligations and liberties - and is measured through questions 
relating to identification with state-like symbols of the EU (EU flag, anthem, passport). By contrast, 
the cultural component of European identity concerns citizens perceptions of how close they feel to 
Europeans compared to non-Europeans and whether there is a shared European heritage. In a 
similar vein, Checkel and Katsenstein (2009) distinguish an outward-looking and cosmopolitan 
European identity focused on citizenship rights versus an inward-looking, national-populist 
European identity with cultural and ethnic content.  
 
European identity measures and levels 
Empirical evidence on the identification of citizens with Europe is largely based on European and 
international surveys, which have included a range of questions to measure citizens identification 
with Europe (Box 1).  
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One of the most commonly used questions since 1992 is the so- called Moreno question: Do you in 
the near future see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and 
(nationality) or European only? In terms of the conceptual discussion earlier, this indicator can be 
considered a self-identification (cognitive) measure as opposed to an affective measure of 
attachment. Reviewing previous analyses of this indicator (e.g. Green 2000; Citrin and Sides 2004; 
Citrin 2009; Risse 2010; 2014; Sanders et al. 2012) and more recent trends in the data points to 
several conclusions.  
First, a majority of citizens identify themselves as European to some extent, compared to a minority 
that consider themselves exclusively national. However, this majority consider themselves national 
first and then European, which has been termed inclusive nationalism (Hooghe and Marks 2005) or 
European identity lite (Risse 2010). Few citizens consider themselves European first then national, 
and fewer still European exclusively.  
Second, levels of dual (national and European) identity overall do not vary dramatically over time. 
However, it is striking that following a dip after the crisis in 2007/8 the level of European identity 
overall recovered to pre-crisis levels in 2010 and reached a historical high in 2015 with more than 
half of citizens (52 percent) feeling national and European for the very first time (Figure 1). Political 
support for the EU in terms of positive perceptions of membership and associated benefits has also 
increased in recent years, although citizens trust in the EU remains significantly below pre-crisis 
levels (EPRS 2016).  
Third, there are significant variations in European identity across Member States. Historically, 
citizens of the founding Member States and Southern European Member States have greater levels 
of European identity than citizens in Scandinavian countries or the in UK (Citrin and Sides 2004). 
The UK has the lowest level of European identity historically, no doubt being part of the explanation 
for the negative referendum result on continued membership of the EU in June 2016. Levels of 
identity in the new Member States are generally lower than in the older Member States (Ceka and 
Sokja 2016). The most recent Eurobarometer data reveals marked increases in European identity 
from 2010 to 2015 in many countries (notably in Germany, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Netherlands and Sweden), while only Cyprus has witnessed a significant fall.  
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Box 1: European identity survey questions 
 
Geographical belonging 
To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? And the next?  
(a) Locality or town where you live, Region or country where you live Your country as a whole, 
Europe, 
(b) Europe 1st choice; Europe 2nd choice; Europe not 
 
Thinking of self as European 
(a) Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe? 
often, sometimes, never, (dont know) 
(b) Do you ever think of yourself not only as a (nationality) citizen but also as a citizen of Europe? 
often, sometimes, never, (dont know) 
(c) Does the thought ever occur to you that you are not only (nationality) but also European? 
Does this happen often, sometimes, never, (dont know) 
d) Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European? Does this happen 
often, sometimes, never, (dont know) [1990, 1991, 2005, 2006] 
(e) Does the thought ever occur to you that you are not only (nationality) but also a European? 
10-point scale: not at all also European.very much also European (dont know) 
 
Attachment to Europe/European Union 
(a) How attached (or: close/emotionally attached/identifying with) do you feel to Europe? 
(b) How attached (or: close/emotionally attached/identifying with) do you feel to the European 
Union? 
(a and b): very attached/very close, fairly attached/close, not very attached/not very close, not 
at all attached/not close at all, (dont know) 
 
National versus European 
In the near future do you see yourself as? 
(a) (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only, 
(dont know) 
(b) EB: 61.02004 (b) (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European only, (dont know) 
[split ballot with version a) in EB 61.0 2004] 
(c) EB: 62.02004 (c) (nationality) only, firstly (nationality) and then European, firstly European 
and then (nationality), European only, as (nationality) as European (spontaneous), (dont know) 
[split ballot with version a) in EB 62.0, 2004] 
 
Proud to be European 
And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be 
European?  
(a) very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud, (dont know) 
(b) additionally: I do not feel European (spontaneous) 
 
Source: Isernia et al. (2012) 
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Figure 1: Trends in European identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EPRS (2016)
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It is important to note that the accuracy of European identity measures is open to criticism for 
methodological reasons. Limitations in the questionnaires designs and assumptions include (Diez-
Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Bruter 2005): 
x questionable validity of some of the measures of identity;  
x the conflation of distinct concepts unrelated to identity in some questions;  
x awkward wording which is interpreted differently in different languages;  
x a failure to tap into the different contents and meanings of identity; and  
x the inability to undertake systematic time series analysis because of changes to identity 
questions over time and gaps in the frequency of use  
 
These limitations have led some researchers to favour more qualitative and indirect measures of 
European identity based on in-depth interviews about citizens experiences and senses of living in 
Europe that tap into identity meanings and narratives (Meinhof 2003; Favell et al. 2011). Studies 
employing qualitative approaches generally find that the level of European identity is much lower 
than reported in surveys, suggesting that the direct prompts and requests for self-categorisation 
used in mass surveys lead to biased responses; and that identity constructions are often fluid, 
contradictory and context-dependent (e.g. Armbruster et al. 2003; Diez-Medrano 2010). By contrast, 
Cram (2012) theorises that implicit European identity manifested in everyday interactions between 
citizens and the EU is implicit, often unconscious and, therefore, likely to be more widespread than 
is reported in surveys. 
 
Explaining European identity 
Explanations of European identity tend to distinguish between individual-level factors and macro-
institutional and contextual factors (for recent reviews, see Favell et al. 2011; Kaina and Karolewski 
2013). The key individual-level determinants of European identity include:  
x instrumental/functionalist calculations about the costs and benefits from European 
integration, as the winners  are more likely to identify positively with the EU than the losers 
(Laffan 2004; Fligstein 2009; Fligstein et al. 2012; Bellucci et al 2012);  
 
x transnational experiences and social interactions, which can increase collective 
identification in line with socialisation theories (Fligstein 2009; Bellucci et al 2012);  
 
x the strength of pre-existing territorial identities at national or sub-national level, which 
can reinforce or challenge European identification (Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Bruter 
2005; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Marks 1999; Marks and Hooghe 2003; Chaca 2013);  
 
x trust in national political institutions, with low trust encouraging more loyalty and 
identification with the supranational EU-level institutions, which has been labelled a 
substitution cueing effect based on dissatisfaction (Bellucci et al 2012); 
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x socio-demographic characteristics, with higher income, occupational status and 
educational levels being associated with higher levels of European identification in line with 
cognitive mobilisation theory, which suggests that this group is more likely to identify with 
their own political community and consequently beabler to commit to other political 
communities (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Citrin and Sides 
2004; Fligstein, 2009).  
 
Turning to macro-institutional explanations, EU exposure and persuasion are conceived as a top-
down driver of European identity in much of the identity literature (European Commission 2012b). 
EU institutions can act as identity agents through the promotion of identity-building policies and 
political symbols such as the European flag, the Euro bank note and Europe Day (Bruter 2003, 2005; 
Cram 2012, 2013; Risse 2003; Laffan 2004). The mechanism at play is socialisation through 
persuasion, and can be distinguished from incremental socialisation whereby individuals gradually 
internalise EU norms and rules over time (Risse 2010). Both mechanisms chime with Crams notion 
of banal Europeanism, which maintains that European Union identity is underpinned by an implicit 
and incremental process, which is banal, contingent and contextual based on Billigs (1995) concept 
of banal nationalism, and driven by everyday exposure to the European Union. Similarly, social-
psychological research on European identity suggests that identification with the EU is dependent 
on the psychological existence of the EU as a real entity in citizens minds based on the concept of 
entiativity (Castano 2004). 
National institutions and norms also matter. Country-level variations in European identity can be 
partly explained by differences in the fit or resonance between European and national identity 
constructions and political norms, such as state-centred republicanism in France, parliamentary 
democracy and external sovereignty in the UK, and federalism, democracy and social market 
economy in Germany (Marcussen et al. 1999; Risse et al 1999; Risse 2001; 2010). Domestic actors 
(political elites, parties and the media) in turn can shape public opinion and identification with the 
EU through the adoption of pro or anti-European messages and platforms (Bruter 2003, 2005; 
Fligstein 2009; Medrano 2003). The impact of such framing on collective identification is becoming 
more important given the increasing politicisation of Europe in national public spheres (Risse 2010; 
2015).   
The significance of these factors for the development of European identity is contested. On the one 
hand, various studies conclude that the EU has contributed to European identification through: 
European symbols and the Euro (Bruter 2005; 2008; Risse 2003; 2014); media campaigns (Bruter 
2005; Stoeckel 2011; Harrison and Bruter 2014); elite discourses and narratives (Risse 2010); and the 
promotion of transnational interactions among citizens (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2012) and university 
students (Mitchell 2014; Stoeckel 2016).  
On the other hand, quantitative studies of European identity among the mass public based on 
aggregate-level measures show limited change (or an absence of dramatic shifts changes) in 
identity over long periods of time (Green 2000; Sanders et al. 2012; cf. Bruter 2005). This contrasts 
with the expectations of neo-functionalist theories of European integration that predicted a transfer 
of loyalties to Europe in response to advances in European integration. The similarity in levels and 
trends in European identification with regional identification measures in other continents - that 
have not witnessed such pronounced economic and political integration - suggests that the EU 
effect is rather limited (Green 2000; Roose 2013).  
Qualitative studies cast doubt on the level of European identification found in mass surveys and on 
the positive effects of transnational interactions and exposure to EU symbols on identity. 
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Ethnographic research on the everyday life narratives of ordinary citizens living in border areas 
where cross-border interactions are common found an absence of European and EU identity 
markers, even when the citizens were exposed to EU-related images (Meinhof 2003; Armbruster et 
al. 2003). Similarly, Diez-Medrano (2003; 2010) found that citizens rarely internalised an emotional 
sense of being European, based on in-depth interviews with citizens in Germany, Spain and the UK. 
Favells (2008) study of arguably the most representative of Europeans  young, mobile and well-
educated professionals that migrate to live and work in cosmopolitan European cities outside of 
their country of origin  found many practical obstacles to the assimilation of these eurostars in the 
receiving cultures and concluded that a truly post-national life was difficult to achieve in practice.  
Several reasons for the questionable success of identity-building efforts by EU institutions have 
been suggested. National institutions have firm control over cultural and educational policies and 
the media, limiting the ability of European institutions to use them to foster identity (Shore 1993, 
2000; Gillespie and Laffan 2006). EU identity-building discourses are usually subordinated to 
national identity-building discourses about the nation-state by political elites (Schmidt 2011). The 
impact of cross-national exchange policies such as ERASMUS is contested, and the programme is 
poorly targeted given that participation is skewed towards well-educated individuals that are more 
likely to identify with the EU anyway (Kuhn 2012). More generally, there are well-known deficits in 
the EU approach to communicating with citizens (Valentini and Nesti 2010; Raube et al. 2013). 
Communication initiatives are mainly geared towards specialist audiences rather than the public 
and the messages are often complex, distant, unappealing, perceived as propaganda, and lacking 
information about the value of the EU. The governance and implementation of EU communication 
initiatives are inhibited by limited resources, coordination challenges within and across EU 
institutions, the difficulties in tailoring messages to local contexts, and poor connections with 
national media. Finally, mechanisms for gathering information from the public are weak, and the 
potential of online tools (e.g. social media, blogs) remains largely untapped.  
 
Methodological approaches 
The methodological approaches and assumptions underpinning existing European identity research 
are diverse, which partly explains the disparate and sometimes conflicting findings across studies 
(Risse 2010). Quantitative studies employing statistical techniques have drawn mainly on 
Eurobarometer survey data to investigate individual and mass level European identity across the EU 
(Isernia et al. 2012; Belluci et al. 2012). These data have provided a rich source of information for 
assessing European identity patterns and determinants across Member States and over time. As 
noted earlier, they also suffer from methodological limitations relating to their questionnaire 
designs and assumptions.  
Experimental techniques have been deployed less frequently to study European identity, taking one 
of two forms: before and after tests and control group tests (or combinations of both). The first 
involves measuring levels of identity in a sample before and after an experimental manipulation, 
such as a video with European identity-related images that is expected to increase identification 
scores in the post-manipulation measure of identity (e.g. Catano 2004). The second technique 
involves undertaking control-group tests by exposing one group of participants to the experimental 
manipulation (EU-related images and messages) and comparing the results to another group that 
have not been exposed to the images and messages (Catano 2004; Bruter 2003; Patriokis and Cram 
2015). The main advantage of experimental techniques is the strong control by the experimenter in 
manipulating the variables of interest while holding other variables constant, which provides 
confidence in identifying causal effects. A common weakness in these studies is the use of student 
  
  
 
14 
 
respondents that are not representative of the general population, which reduce the 
generalizability of the findings. Nor are they able to measure the long-term temporal effects of 
exposure to EU symbols that are considered important to identity construction dynamics in much of 
the literature.  By contrast, Bruter (2009) has undertaken an experimental study of the effects of 
symbols and news messages on citizens identity using a diversified (but still not representative) 
sample, while taking the temporal dimension more seriously through a three-wave panel survey 
methodology (rather than a one-shot experiment).  
In contrast to the positivist epistemology of statistical and experimental techniques, discourse 
analytic and ethnographic studies of European identity are rooted in constructivist and interpretivist 
assumptions emphasising human perception and interpretation of complex concepts such as 
identity (Meinhoff 2003; Wodak 2004; Holmes 2009). In a similar vein, qualitative approaches 
employing focus groups and in-depth interviews have been used to study citizens understandings 
of the meaning of European identity (Medrano 2003; Bruter 2005; Duchesne et al. 2013; for a review, 
see European Commission 2012b). While these approaches can provide deeper insights into the 
complexity, fluidity and contradictory nature of European identity feelings and understandings, the 
conclusions are difficult to generalise beyond the specific cases and restricted samples.  
Mixed-method approaches combining qualitative and quantitative methods systematically are rare. 
A frequently cited study is Diez-Medranos Framing Europe (2003), which combined ethnographic, 
interpretive, historical, and statistical methods including analysis of press publications, public 
speeches, in-depth interviews with citizens and elites and Eurobarometer data. Despite being 
regularly cited in the European identity literature, the primary focus of the study was on analysing 
and explaining differences in the framing and political support for the EU rather than collective 
identification, although qualitative findings relating to European identity were subsequently 
reported in Diez-Medrano (2010). By contrast, Bruters (2005) mixed-methods study focused 
squarely on European identity combining statistical analysis of Eurobarometer data, an original 
survey and focus groups with university students (the latter raising problems of bias and 
generalizability to a wider population) in three countries. Strikingly, there are no mixed-method and 
comparative studies investigating the impact of specific EU expenditure policies on citizens identity.  
 
2.2 EU Cohe sion polic y  and Europe an ide ntity :  unc harte d te rritory 
 
The impact of Cohesion policy on EU attitudes and identity 
While scholarship on European identity has grown rapidly over recent decades, research on the role 
of EU Cohesion policy in promoting European identity remains uncharted academic terrain. There 
are several quantitative studies assessing the impact of Cohesion policy funding on citizens support 
for the EU but not on European identity directly. Nor are there any qualitative studies explicitly 
assessing the impact of Cohesion policy on territorial identity, although there are some relevant 
insights from research on EU-funded cross-border initiatives. 
Beginning with the available quantitative research, a frequently-cited study on European identity 
employing ethnographic and linguistic methods used photos of EU-funded cross-border 
infrastructure investments (e.g. buildings, roads, waste treatment plants with the EU plaque) as 
visual triggers for discussing the life experiences of families living in European border areas 
(Armbruster et al. 2003; Meinhoff 2003; 2004). The expectation was that the photos would prompt 
awareness, discussions of attitudes and emotions about the role of Europe in their daily lives. 
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Contrary to expectations, the key finding was that images of EU-funded projects did not generally 
trigger European identity narratives. Rather, the photos were unrecognized, ignored or interpreted 
as local-regional (rather than European) issues. Sometimes they even triggered resentment against 
the bordering communities and suspicion about the motivation for the projects owing to a lack of 
knowledge about their purpose and/or insensitivity to local needs.  
The key policy conclusion was that cross-border EU investments needed to be much more sensitive 
to local peoples concerns, attitudes, and grievances if they are to be successful in bringing 
communities together. Although not stated explicitly, a logical implication is that better 
communication about the rationale and benefits of EU-funded investments could support this 
policy prescription. A cautionary remark is worth noting about the research design of this study with 
potentially important implications for the findings. The fieldwork took place in 2000 before the 
accession of some of the (Eastern countries) covered in the research. It is therefore possible that 
European attitudes and identities have changed in the borderland areas in the interim period, not 
least because of major increases in investment to the Eastern side of the border and because of the 
need for a long-term perspective to measure collective identification processes between new and 
old Member Sstates. Related, it is arguable that some of the cases selected represent hard tests for 
collective identity formation (e.g. on the German-Polish border) because of historically high levels 
of territorial conflict and wide socio-economic disparities that militate against collective identity 
formation, at least in the short term. 
A more recent post-accession study on a Polish-German border region after the abolition of border 
checks in 2007 examined the impact of an EU-funded cross-border initiative (the small projects 
fund) on building trust and the development of cross-border networks between residents (rather 
  Ȍ ȋÏ  -Mirwaldt 2014). Based on interviews with 51 
participants before and after the cross-border projects (mainly teenagers participating in cultural, 
creative and sporting events), it found that the exchanges were generally very positive experiences 
but did not change opinions in the majority of cases. However, this was mainly because the 
participants' perceptions of their neighbors were positive before the projects began and 
involvement in previous projects may have impacted on opinions. Attitudinal change was only 
found in five (out of 51) participants, with two of these reporting negative opinions and a positive 
change in perceptions in the other three cases. Nevertheless, the study found that EU-funded cross-
border contacts did promote a sense of familiarity with neighboring people, a feeling of trust and 
helped to breakdown crude national stereotypes. 
Another relevant EU-funded research project examined the impact of regional economic 
development trends on collective identities in six European countries, based on case studies 
drawing on documentary analysis, interviews with citizens and focus groups (Kirk et al. 2011; Wodz 
and Gnieciak 2012; Revilla et al. 2013). However, the main focus was on changing social identities (in 
terms of social class and gender) instead of European identity, and the contribution of EU Cohesion 
policy was not explicitly investigated, notwithstanding cursory acknowledgements of the EUs 
financial contribution to domestic regeneration initiatives in a limited number of the case studies 
(Meier and Promberger 2011; Wódz et al. 2011).  
Turning to quantitative studies on Cohesion policy and European attitudes, there are several 
statistical analyses of the effects of Structural Fund transfers on public support for the EU using 
data on public opinion survey and financial allocations at regional level, albeit providing conflicting 
conclusions.  Contrary to expectations, a study by Duch and Taylor (1997) found that Cohesion 
policy funding transfers did not generate significant political goodwill in term of support for 
European integration. In fact, regions that benefited most from EU Cohesion policy were less 
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enthusiastic about economic integration than richer regions receiving less support. However, the 
study used regional allocations data from 1983 and 1986, prior to the landmark 1988 reforms that 
doubled the budget for Cohesion policy. 
By contrast, studies of the impact of Structural Funds on public support for the EU in the late 90s, 
following a sizeable increase in the structural funds budget, found a statistically significant and 
positive effect (Brinegar et al. 2004; Osterloh 2008). In addition, Osterloh (2008) found that citizens 
awareness of being a beneficiary was conditional on socio-economic background (particularly level 
of education) and that awareness translated into higher public support for the EU. A sizeable effect 
was mainly detected for those citizens who were direct recipients of EU funds, while publicity and 
information sources (such as TV, information signs) had a positive but smaller effect.  
A more recent analysis by Chalmers and Dellmuth (2016) using data on ERDF allocations for 2007-
2010 found that the Cohesion policy funding did not have a direct effect on public support for the 
EU, but rather a conditional effect media7ted by the level of citizens European identity and 
education. Moreover, the study also found that political party attitudes towards European 
redistribution did not mediate the effect of Cohesion funding transfer on support for the EU, 
implying that Cohesion policy is not politicised at the national level. 
 
 
Survey findings of citizens awareness and attitudes to Cohesion policy 
Citizens awareness and attitudes to Cohesion policy have been measured in four periodic 
Eurobarometer surveys between 2008 and 2015. Overall, around half of EU citizens have heard of 
the ERDF or Cohesion Fund (in 2013 and 2015), but only a third of citizens were aware of local EU-
funded projects in their region or city (2010, 2013 and 2015) (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Citizens awareness of Cohesion policy (% of respondents) 
  
 MS 
Awareness of ERDF or Cohesion Fund* Awareness of local EU-funded projects ** 
2015 2013 2010 2008 2015 2013 2010 2008 
AT 52 52 16 na 17 16 22 64 
BE 31 34 10 na 21 17 15 40 
BG 79 76 19 na 43 62 45 35 
CY 44 35 21 na 28 24 41 35 
CZ 69 70 38 na 73 67 58 55 
DE 36 36 27 na 26 15 19 46 
DK 32 30 16 na 16 13 16 23 
EE 71 69 43 na 50 53 57 62 
EL 60 60 40 na 41 38 45 47 
ES  56 60 39 na 28 33 43 62 
FI 54 64 24 na 22 24 34 38 
FR 35 37 10 na 26 28 25 45 
HR 81 79 na na 57 39 na na 
HU 69 66 36 na 67 62 59 43 
IE 61 67 59 na 24 27 17 64 
IT 47 54 10 na 43 48 33 56 
LT 66 64 37 na 69 67 66 65 
LU 44 43 23 na 32 27 26 49 
LV 71 76 35 na 64 65 68 59 
MT 58 52 26 na 59 35 39 64 
NL 29 32 24 na 21 15 19 30 
PL 80 84 59 na 76 80 69 65 
PT 65 65 21 na 29 51 50 40 
RO 72 75 20 na 45 46 64 61 
SE 38 42 21 na 21 23 28 24 
SI 77 81 33 na 52 60 59 66 
SK 78 77 34 na 63 65 71 56 
UK 36 40 25 na 9 10 13 38 
EU  49 52 30 na 34 34 34 49 
 
Notes: *Question: Have you heard about any EU co-financed projects to improve the area where you live? **Question: 
Have you heard of the European Regional Development Fund or Cohesion Funds? (Responses: yes, no) 
Source: Eurobarometer  
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Three quarters of citizens that have heard of EU-funded projects believe that the impact has been 
positive (Table 2), but only around a fifth of citizens that have heard of the ERDF or Cohesion Fund 
feel that they have personally benefitted in their daily life from an EU-funded project (Table 3).  
The surveys reveal significant variations across Member States in both awareness and perceived 
impacts/benefits of the policy. A strong link was found between awareness and the relative scale of 
financial allocations, and positive perceptions of impact are strongly linked to benefiting from the 
funds. The main sources of communication driving awareness about EU co-funded projects are 
television and newspapers. 
Table 2: Citizens perceptions of the impact of EU-funded projects (% of respondents)* 
MS 
2015 2013 2010 
Pos. Neg. None DK Pos. Neg. None DK Pos. Neg. None DK 
AT 73 11 8 8 85 7 5 3 77 8 na 15 
BE 74 10 7 9 77 8 7 8 82 9 na 9 
BG 83 6 4 7 83 7 4 6 72 14 na 14 
CY 83 7 7 3 83 3 10 4 82 7 na 11 
CZ 85 7 1 7 85 7 2 6 84 7 na 9 
DE 73 10 8 9 88 3 7 2 80 6 na 14 
DK 67 4 14 15 65 0 19 16 60 8 na 32 
EE 90 1 4 5 91 2 3 4 89 4 na 7 
EL 79 12 7 2 75 11 11 3 74 17 na 9 
ES 80 8 7 5 76 12 8 4 79 11 na 10 
FI 87 2 6 5 84 3 6 7 86 4 na 10 
FR 71 12 7 10 75 7 11 7 71 10 na 19 
HR 78 4 11 7 76 6 14 4 na na na na 
HU 88 3 4 5 92 2 3 3 86 6 na 9 
IE 91 3 4 2 96 3 1 0 90 3 na 7 
IT 41 22 23 14 51 20 16 13 56 15 na 29 
LT 92 1 2 5 87 4 5 4 90 3 na 7 
LU 82 6 7 5 90 4 2 4 86 5 na 9 
LV 93 2 2 3 90 4 2 4 79 12 na 9 
MT 89 2 5 4 91 2 5 2 80 5 na 15 
NL 81 8 4 7 69 12 10 9 80 8 na 12 
PL 90 4 1 5 93 3 1 3 90 4 na 6 
PT 80 5 8 7 63 14 13 10 70 15 na 15 
RO 83 7 5 5 85 6 4 5 73 15 na 12 
SE 77 2 10 11 71 3 10 16 61 6 na 32 
SI 82 5 8 5 84 5 8 3 81 7 na 12 
SK 81 7 4 8 80 7 5 8 84 6 na 11 
UK 66 9 15 10 72 5 10 13 70 9 na 21 
EU  75 9 8 8 77 9 8 6 76 10 na 14 
 
Notes: *Question: Taking into consideration all the projects you have heard about, would you say that this support has 
had a positive or negative impact on the development of your city or region? (Responses: positive, negative, none, 
dont know) 
Source: Eurobarometer  
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Table 3: Citizens perceived benefits of EU-funded projects (% of respondents)* 
MS 
2015 2013 2010 2008 
Yes No DK Yes No DK Yes No DK Yes No DK 
AT 16 81 3 12 81 7 8 88 4 74 20 5 
BE 9 88 3 8 89 3 4 96 1 59 30 11 
BG 44 53 3 18 77 5 10 85 5 58 37 5 
CY 18 79 3 24 66 10 13 83 4 69 26 6 
CZ 53 39 8 42 49 9 25 69 6 73 16 11 
DE 8 87 5 14 84 2 9 87 3 74 18 9 
DK 6 78 16 8 80 12 6 85 9 67 16 18 
EE 30 54 16 34 52 14 29 62 10 67 23 10 
EL 30 67 3 23 73 4 24 71 6 70 27 3 
ES 15 80 5 20 75 5 21 75 3 84 10 6 
FI 13 72 13 14 84 2 12 84 5 73 11 17 
FR 7 90 3 7 91 2 4 94 2 53 42 6 
HR 9 87 4 8 90 2 na na na na na na 
HU 43 51 6 33 61 6 24 71 5 63 33 4 
IE 28 59 13 34 58 8 23 70 7 89 8 4 
IT 5 94 1 9 88 3 5 95 1 68 23 9 
LT 30 64 6 27 70 3 28 65 6 90 7 3 
LU 13 85 2 11 83 6 11 88 1 70 21 9 
LV 44 51 5 37 58 5 26 70 5 62 29 9 
MT 14 82 4 21 75 4 17 79 5 77 15 8 
NL 15 77 8 6 88 6 7 89 4 63 17 21 
Pl 59 36 5 59 38 3 44 54 3 82 15 3 
PT 9 88 3 11 87 2 12 85 3 70 25 6 
RO 17 81 2 14 74 12 15 81 4 60 36 4 
SE 8 76 16 11 78 11 9 77 14 71 12 16 
SK 33 58 9 31 60 9 25 68 7 72 16 11 
SL 33 62 5 32 64 4 23 71 6 46 50 5 
UK 10 78 12 12 77 11 5 90 5 65 22 13 
EU 21 74 5 20 75 5 13 84 4 70 22 8 
 
Notes: Question: Have you benefitted in your daily life from a project funded by the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF) or the Cohesion Fund? (responses: yes, no, dont know) 
Source: Eurobarometer  
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Limitations in the questionnaire designs and sampling hinder the use of these surveys to investigate 
European identity and Cohesion policy  the main aim of the COHESIFY project. As the surveys did 
not include questions about European identity or general EU support, it is not possible to analyse 
the relationship between perceptions of Cohesion policy and support for/identification with the EU 
at the individual level. The potential reasons for negative perceptions of Cohesion policy are not 
elaborated in the questionnaires (e.g. mismanagement, fraud, institutional capacity, the socio-
economic context, impact of the crisis, media-reporting etc.) hindering analysis of the motivations 
for citizens perceptions. Nor do the survey questions elaborate on the meaning of impact or 
distinguish impact from other types of added value that Cohesion policy may bring to the region 
such as multi-level and participatory governance. Lastly, the sample populations in these surveys 
are representative at the national level (not at the regional level), which prevents a robust regional-
level analysis being conducted of attitudes to Cohesion policy and the EU. This issue has been 
recognised by the Committee of the Regions, which is now calling for more regional and local level 
Eurobarometer surveys to be undertaken as part of its efforts to reconnect Europe with citizens 
(Committee of the Regions 2014).  
 
The effectiveness of communication strategies 
Another relevant strand of literature is evaluation research and applied policy analysis on EU 
Cohesion policy communication. Of particular relevance are studies of the implementation and 
effectiveness of Cohesion policy communication strategies, which aim to promote the image of the 
EU among beneficiaries and citizens (e.g. Taylor and Raines 2003). A cross-national review of 
programme communication plans for 2007-13 found that communication with the public was a key 
strategic priority and that the most commonly used tools were television and radio media 
(Technopolis 2009). A key strategic weakness in most cases was a lack of differentiation in the 
communication plans according to target groups and civil society. Further, the strategic rationale 
for communicating with the public was often vaguely formulated hindering the assessment of 
expected impacts. However, as the study was conducted during the early stages of the launch of EU 
co-funded programmes (in 2008), it was unable to assess the implementation, results and impacts 
of the publicity and communication strategies over the lifetime of the 2007-13 cycle.  
A more recent study has identified and assessed good practices in regional policy communication 
targeting the public, based on case studies in eight Member States and an assessment of 
communication activities by DG Regio (Coffey 2013; Wrona 2014). More than 50 approaches, 
activities and tools were identified as good practice within the Member States for various reasons, 
such as their design, content, the language used, outreach, novelty effects, visibility of the EU and 
the extent to which key messages defined by the EU are reflected. Significant challenges in 
communicating with the public were also highlighted, relating to the complexity of regional policy 
coupled with low levels of awareness, a lack of media interest and a deterioration of public opinion 
towards the EU following the crisis. With respect to the role of the European Commission, the study 
found that communication has not been a key priority for DG Regio and that its approach to 
communication has been rather conservative, risk averse and detached from issues that are of 
concern to the general public. While there have been improvements in media relations, and some 
outreach activities are viewed very positively by stakeholders, the focus has been mainly on 
specialist audiences rather than reaching the general public. Further, coverage of EU Cohesion 
policy has been relatively low in much of the media and there has been a tendency to report 
negative stories. Subnational media are more likely to report regional policy-related stories, but 
seldom emphasise the EU dimension. Key recommendations include the need for a more strategic 
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approach to communication, underpinned by a digital strategy and a stronger focus on story-telling 
to communicate the benefits and impact of regional policy to citizens. Greater efforts are also 
needed to help MAs communicate more effectively with the general public. 
 
Multi-level governance and Europeanisation 
Despite the limited research on the impact of EU Cohesion policy on EU attitudes and identity, 
there is a substantial body of relevant research on its territorial governance and wider impacts on 
domestic polities under the conceptual frameworks of Multi-Level Governance (MLG) and 
Europeanisation research (for a review, see Bache 2008; Bachtler et al. 2013). According to the early 
MLG literature, Cohesion policy and its partnership-based model of implementation were expected 
to mobilise sub-national actors demands for political influence in decision-making and even to 
transform constitutional arrangements for territorial governance (Marks 1992; 1993: Hooghe 1996; 
Marks and Hooghe 2001). The implication is that Cohesion policy has transformative effects on 
territorial structures of governance as well as identities embedded in these structures.  
However, most empirical studies credit Cohesion policy with playing a supportive or minor role in 
territorial governance rescaling processes, and none of these has directly examined the impact on 
territorial identities. Moreover, empirical studies usually conceptualise identity as a domestic 
intervening variable mediating the impact of Cohesion policy on territorial governance rather than a 
dependent variable to investigate or explain. Yet, even if EU identification has not been the primary 
object of analysis, there is evidence that Cohesion policy can stimulate learning and socialisation 
dynamics among actors and alter domestic beliefs, values and norms among policy elites and 
practitioners (e.g. Bachtler et al. 2014; Cartwright and Batory 2012; Dabrowski 2011; Scherpereel 
2010) implying that similar effects on citizens are possible.  
 
3.  A framework for analysis 
 
COHESIFY aims to make a conceptual, methodological and analytical contribution towards a better 
understanding of the relationship between EU Cohesion policy and EU identity. While there is a 
scarcity of academic research on the contribution of specific expenditure policies to citizens 
identification with the EU (beyond the ERASMUS programme), there is extensive research on many 
of the component parts of the project  European identity, Cohesion policy implementation, 
performance and communication. A novel aspect of the analytical framework underpinning 
COHESIFY will be to investigate the interplay between these components.  
Cohesion policy can be considered a most likely case for impacting on European identity formation 
for several reasons. First, Cohesion policy is the EUs move visible expression of solidarity between 
Member States and regions providing transfers from richer Member States to poorer countries and 
regions to support economic and social development. The policys solidarity rationale explicitly aims 
to foster a common sense of community across Member States and regions by contributing to 
territorial development and EU citizens wellbeing. The establishment of Cohesion policy was partly 
motivated by the view that collective loyalties and the sustainability of the European integration 
project itself were dependent on the existence of a policy for tackling inequalities in citizens living 
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standards across the community. As stated in the European Commissions Thomson Report, which 
set out the case for creating the European regional development fund (Thomson 1973: 4): 
No Community could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the people which belong to it 
so long as some have very different standards of living and have to doubt the common will 
of all to help each Member State to better the conditions of its people  
Indeed, regional development and equalisation policies have been important components of state-
building strategies across the globe and are often part of the constitutional commitments of the 
state (e.g. in Germany, Italy and Spain) or central to a wide range of government economic 
development policies with a direct impact on peoples daily lives. 
Second and related, Cohesion policy is recognised to be one of the most visible EU policies, 
particularly at the regional and local levels. This is not only because of the visibility of Cohesion 
policy investments (especially transport infrastructure labelled with the European plaque) but also 
because of its multi-level governance model of implementation involving shared decision-making 
between EU, national and sub-national actors. The policys partnership principle requires direct 
engagement with societal actors in programme design and delivery through consultation processes, 
structures and policy networks. In this way, Cohesion policy is intended to increase sub-national 
ownership of EU goals including the Europe 2020 strategy  although how the principle is 
implemented varies significantly between and within countries. Moreover, each Cohesion policy 
programme (there are currently more than 450 programmes across the EU28) has an explicit 
publicity and communication strategy  strengthened in the 2013 reform to promote the image of 
the EU supported by communication officers and networks at EU and national levels.  
Third, Cohesion policy commands substantial public support among citizens. Successive 
Eurobarometer surveys show that there is widespread awareness of Cohesion policy and that 
among those citizens who are aware of the policy a significant majority consider that it has been 
beneficial for the development of their region, albeit with significant variations across Member 
States. However, the effectiveness of the policy in addressing its goals is disputed, and there is 
strong criticism of the bureaucracy of administration amongst stakeholders as well as common 
reports of irregular and fraudulent spending in the media. 
 
3.1 Conc e ptual approac h 
 
COHESIFY will assess how and to what extent EU Cohesion policy affects citizens perceptions of 
and identification with the European Union. The research design conceptualises Cohesion policy as 
an independent variable, while citizens perceptions of, and identification with, the EU are the 
dependent variable(s) following a classic Europeanisation research design (Risse et al. 2001). 
Assessing the degree of impact, the underlying causal mechanisms and the intervening variables 
mediating the effects of Cohesion policy on EU perceptions and identity are the core research tasks 
for COHESIFY.  
Cohesion policy is not assumed to be the only factor shaping citizens perceptions and identification 
with the EU. In this respect, a key goal and outcome of COHESIFY will be to specify and delimit the 
role and scope conditions of Cohesion policy influence on citizens attitudes. Nor can the null 
hypothesis be discounted, namely that Cohesion policy will have no impact on European attitudes 
and identity. This is a real possibility, at the very least in countries and regions where the financial 
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scale of support is limited and the policys visibility and political salience are low. That said, these 
are ultimately empirical questions for the project to investigate against new data.  
To investigate the impact of Cohesion policy on European identity, the project focuses on four inter 
related issues: 
(a) how European identity and perceptions of the EU vary at national, regional and local levels;  
(b) the influence of Cohesion policy on citizens perceptions of the policy and identification with 
the EU; 
(c) whether and how communication about Cohesion policy affects perceptions and 
identification; and  
(d) what is needed to make Cohesion policy more effective in terms of peoples perceptions of 
the policy and the EU more generally. 
In addressing these issues, the core assumptions of the project, which will be tested in the research, 
are that: 
x there is mutual interrelationship between Cohesion policy performance, communication 
and policy perceptions; 
x perceptions of Cohesion policy performance impact on perceptions of the European Union 
and on identification with the EU; and 
x improvement of Cohesion policy performance and communication of achievements can 
improve the perception of the EU and identification with the EU 
Assessing the relationship between European regions, the EU framework for Cohesion policy and 
the impact of Cohesion policy on a positive identification with the European construction is 
fundamental to the research. This will require an assessment of territorial variations in citizens 
perceptions of the EU and identities as well as analysis of perceptions of Cohesion policy and how 
this influences support for and identification with the EU.  
A comparative and mixed-method case study approach is at the heart of the methodology 
incorporating original surveys (of decision-makers, stakeholders and citizens) and focus groups, to 
examine: (i) the historical background of identity formation in the respective countries; (ii) the 
implementation and performance of Cohesion policy, including a policymaker survey and in-depth 
interviews; (iii) the communication aspects in terms of the media and the effectiveness of 
communication strategies, based on the framing analysis, surveys and interviews; and (iv)  public 
perceptions of Cohesion policy and the impact of Cohesion policy on identification with the EU, 
drawing on the citizens survey and focus groups tasks.  
The methodology for the EU-wide comparative research and the selection criteria for the regional 
case studies will provide for variation in key dimensions of theoretical interest related to Cohesion 
policy, including eligibility, financial allocations, strategic objectives and priorities, territorial 
governance, implementation arrangements, and policy history (discussed below).  
The project is designed around four substantive research work packages (WP2-5) beginning with a 
contextual mapping of EU territorial challenges, attitudes and identities (WP2). The 
implementation, performance and communication of EU Cohesion policy is then examined in WP3 
and WP4, feeding into the core substantive questions on citizens perceptions of Cohesion policy 
and the impact on citizens attitudes to the EU and drawing conclusions and recommendations 
(WP5).  
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x WP2 Regional context, challenges and identities will provide a review of conceptual and 
methodological knowledge on European identities to inform the detailed analytical 
approach of all other project activities. Moreover, it will establish a territorial typology, 
identifying clusters of countries/regions according to identity, political culture, territorial 
and institutional characteristics, receptiveness vulnerability and desirability of EU Cohesion 
policy as a basis for the selection of the case studies for in-depth analysis in WPs 3-5. The 
final task of WP2 will investigate the role of political parties and how parties frame 
European integration and EU Cohesion policy through content analysis of election 
manifestos, coalition agreements and government statements at the regional level in the 
case study Member States over time. 
x WP3 Cohesion policy implementation and performance will provide a comparative analysis 
of Cohesion policy implementation and performance at regional level across the EU and 
how implementation and performance is perceived among key stakeholder groups involved 
in the case study regions. A combination of secondary data analysis and fieldwork interview 
research will gather data on Cohesion policy implementation/performance that can be 
related  at regional level  with other work packages examining perceptions of Europe, the 
communication of the policy and citizens awareness and perceptions of the policy. 
x WP4 Communication of Cohesion policy will analyse the communication aspects of 
Cohesion policy building on the European identity literature and its emphasis on the role of 
exposure and persuasion in European identity constructions. An innovative, mixed 
methodological schema will be implemented that involves: framing analysis to investigate 
how Cohesion policy is framed and interpreted by selected mainstream (offline and online) 
media; a multilevel analysis of Cohesion policy's communication strategy 
(regional/national/EU), which includes a survey of Cohesion policy stakeholders; the 
application of computer science techniques (data-mining and sentiment analysis) to collect 
and analyse Cohesion policy material that is available online; and the development of a web 
platform that will be used for data collection and analysis. 
x WP5 Perceptions of Cohesion policy and attitudes to the EU will bring together the results 
of WPs 2-4 and will address the central question of whether and to what extent perceptions 
of Cohesion policy impact on attitudes to the EU. An original survey of citizens attitudes to 
Cohesion policy and the EU will be undertaken in a sample of regions/countries, 
complemented by focus-group discussions in a subset of countries/regions. The survey and 
focus groups will inform national/regional reports drawing also on research from the other 
work packages, which will in turn be used to draw out key conclusions and lessons to 
promote learning about how to improve civic appreciation of Cohesion policy and the EU. 
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Figure 2: Structure of the Work Packages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conceptualisation of EU identity and support, policy performance, governance and actors, and 
communication is as follows. 
(i) European identity and support 
 
The project adopts a multi-dimensional approach to conceptualising citizens attitudes to the EU, 
distinguishing between the distinct concepts of identification with the EU and support for the 
regime.  In line with mass opinion surveys, key sub-dimensions and questions that will be used to 
capture European identity and support for the EU are:  
x EU identity: geographical belonging to the EU, thinking of oneself as European, sense of 
attachment to Europe, European vs. national identification, and pride in Europe; the nature 
and content of European identification (civic, cultural, ethnic, etc.) and 
x regime support: whether membership of the EU is perceived positively (or negatively), and 
whether people perceive their country/region to have benefited from being a member of 
the EU. 
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(ii) Policy performance 
 
Cohesion policy performance is understood to have several distinct dimensions, based on the 
applied policy analysis and evaluation literature on Cohesion policy: 
x effectiveness: the achievement of the policys formal goals in terms of economic, social and 
territorial development; 
x utility: the extent to which the policy impacts on society's needs and resolves socio-
economic problems; 
x added value: a broader concept that relates not only to impacts on developmental 
outcomes, but also to governance/administrative, learning, and visibility effects as well as 
spill-overs into domestic systems and related innovation and efficiency improvements; and 
x regularity-legality: compliance with rules on the probity of spending and legal 
requirements. 
(iii) Governance and actors 
 
A defining feature of Cohesion policy is its multi-level governance model involving EU, national and 
sub-national actors in the design and delivery of economic, social and territorial strategies, 
programmes and projects in partnership. The term multi-level governance was coined and 
popularised through the study of Cohesion policy in the early 1990s, following the landmark reform 
of 1988 and the formal introduction of the partnership principle (Marks 1992, 1993), closely linked to 
the already-established idea of the subsidiarity principle in terms of sharing powers between several 
levels of authority and ensuring that decisions are taken at the most effective level. There are 
differences across and within Member States in the balance of decision-making powers relating to 
different functional tasks (programming, implementation, audit and control, monitoring, evaluation, 
communication etc.), reflecting differences in domestic political systems, models of interest 
intermediation, the type and scale of funding, historical practices and capacities (Hooghe 1996; 
Bache 2004). 
Accordingly, COHESIFY will adopt a multi-level and multi-actor perspective to study the 
relationship between Cohesion policy and attitudes to the EU distinguishing between different 
levels of governance and types of actors from those involved in programme design and 
implementation to the final beneficiaries of funding and the wider public: 
x Managing Authorities: formally responsible for programme formulation, coordination and 
delivery, managing authorities are integrated into government Ministries or agencies at 
national or regional level;  
x Intermediate bodies/implementing bodies: public or private bodies that act under the 
responsibility of the managing authority carrying out tasks in relation to the 
management/implementation of projects; 
x partners/stakeholders: involved in the programme partnership to oversee delivery and 
monitor performance comprising (i) national/regional, local, urban and other public 
authorities, (ii) economic and social partners, and (iii) other bodies representing civil society, 
environmental partners, NGOs, and gender equality bodies  and brought together formally 
in the Programme Monitoring Committee, which meets periodically to review 
implementation and agree on programme revisions; 
x beneficiaries: private or public bodies that are recipients of funding and are responsible for 
initiating and implementing projects; and  
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x citizens: the broader public who are not direct beneficiaries or involved in decision-making, 
but who are ultimately intended to benefit from the economic, social and territorial impact 
of the policy.  
 
COHESIFY will examine perceptions of the policy among political and policy elites, practitioners and 
wider stakeholders at both EU and national/sub-national levels. This multi-actor perspective will 
allow variations in attitudes across different types of actors to be explored and empirical 
examination of whether the attitudes of political and policy elites and stakeholders are consistent 
with citizens perceptions of the policy and attitudes towards the EU.  
(iv) Communication channels 
 
Communication plays a central role in the building of European identity according to political and 
social psychological and discursive perspectives (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010). In 
examining the communication channels of Cohesion policy influence, COHESIFY will distinguish 
between public communication, on the one hand, and political and social communication on the 
other.  
Public communication refers to the direct publicity and promotion activities that all programmes 
and projects are obliged to undertake. Communication strategies must be implemented to raise 
awareness about funding opportunities among beneficiaries and to promote the image of the EU 
among citizens, obligations which have developed over time and whose components will form the 
basis for the analysis of communication (Table 4).  
Table 4: Communication Cohesion policy  evolution since 1989 
Programme 
period 
Evolution of requirements to inform the public  
1989-1993 Commission to be informed by Managing Authorities (MAs) about information 
towards beneficiaries and general public. 
1994-99 Publicity must be in development plans. Commission Decision laid down 
arrangements for a coherent set of measure to be implemented by competent 
national, regional and local authorities in co-operation with the Commission. 
2000-06 Specific regulation on information and publicity measure contains requirements for 
billboards, communication plans, including strategy and budget, persons in charge at 
national and MA levels for monitoring and co-ordinating the plans: an informal 
network of communications officers, the Structural Funds Information Team (SFIT) 
established. In 2002, European Transparency Initiative (2005) requires access to 
funding data. 
2007-13 Implementing regulation defines minimum requirement for MAs and beneficiaries to 
inform the general public and the publication of a list of final beneficiaries. INFORM 
(DG Regio) and INIO (DG Empl) become formal networks of communication officers 
including annual meetings. 
2014-20 A seven-year communication strategy to be accompanied by annual action plans 
adapted by the Monitoring Committee, single website for all EU Cohesion policy 
programmes at national level; definition of lists of beneficiaries more detailed and 
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updated every six months. 
  
At the EU level, the European Commission has its own communication strategy for Cohesion policy, 
focusing on events, press and media relations, publications and outreach activities including the use 
of social media. Communication networks have also been set up at EU level (e.g INFORM and INIO, 
managed by DG Regio and DG Empl respectively) and within Member States to improve the 
visibility of EU-funded projects, the quality of communication actions and to increase awareness 
among the wider public about the benefits of Cohesion policy. The effectiveness of communication 
strategies at both EU and domestic levels will be investigated to provide a comprehensive multi-
level analysis.  
Political and social communication concerns the wider political and social framing of Cohesion 
policy by political elites/parties, the media and interest groups. Key issues to be investigated in the 
project include the usage of Cohesion policy as a tool for pursuing political interests; the salience 
and tone of media coverage on Cohesion policy and of social media campaigns and platforms; and 
citizens narratives of projects co-funded by EU Cohesion policy.  
(v) Factors influencing the contribution of Cohesion policy to EU identification 
 
The academic literature on EU identity highlights a range of channels through which EU institutions 
and policies can impact on citizens attitudes and identity based on different theoretical 
perspectives and mechanisms.  Drawing on this literature, the projects assessment of the 
contribution of Cohesion policy to a positive identification with the EU will take account of the 
following crucial factors. 
(a) Policy objectives: a distinction can be made between the policys core cohesion objectives 
and values (e.g. regional development and solidarity) and wider EU thematic, macro-
economic and stabilisation objectives relating to the Europe 2020 strategy and economic 
governance, which have become embedded in the policy in recent years and that may have 
different implications for policy perceptions and identification with the EU. 
 
(b) Programme type: an important distinction is between the mainstream (national or 
regional) programmes that operate within countries to promote development, and 
European territorial cooperation (INTERREG) programmes that aim to facilitate territorial 
cooperation across different Member States and regions through joint strategies, projects 
and exchange of experiences, sometimes with the explicit goal of fostering cross-national 
interaction among citizens from different countries and supporting collective identity 
formation.  
 
(c) Scale and scope of funding: the scale, intensity and geographical allocation of Cohesion 
policy vary widely across the EU (e.g. as a share of the population, GDP or capital 
expenditure), implying significant differences in the salience and potential impact of EU 
funding on economic development and identity formation. The scope of expenditure and 
types of instruments supported also vary greatly. In 2014-20, thematic concentration on 11 
objectives (including R&I/smart specialisation, SME competitiveness, sustainable transport 
etc.) is required, but there are variations across countries and regions. For example, large 
and highly visible infrastructure projects are mainly funded in Less-Developed Regions, 
  
  
 
29 
 
whereas More-Developed Regions spend a higher share (in some cases, virtually all 
allocations) on R&I and SME competitiveness.  An important factor is not just how funding 
is allocated but whether it is actually spent. The relative allocations to localities and regions, 
and the levels of absorption, are often important media narratives. 
 
(d) Effectiveness: the extent to which programme objectives are achieved and resolve socio-
economic problems. A positive contribution to identification with the EU assumes that 
citizens perceive that Cohesion policy has been beneficial and/or has effectively addressed 
the economic development objectives that the funds target. 
 
(e) Regularity-legality: the improper use of EU Cohesion policy funds and high-profile cases of 
fraud are likely to impact negatively on citizens perceptions of the policy. Perceptions are 
likely to be partly conditioned by EU-level issues (lack of approval of EU accounts, reports 
on budget approval procedure, error rates), national-level issues (e.g. national audit reports), 
programme-level factors (e.g. payment interruptions, suspensions, recoveries), and project-
level experience. 
 
(f) Communication: knowledge and awareness of EU Cohesion policy among citizens are likely 
to depend on the effectiveness of publicity and communication strategies in different 
countries and regions as well as exposure to media-framing and political discourses, and 
direct experience. It will also depend on whether Cohesion policy provides an effective 
deliberative political space (a public sphere) in which civil society actors can communicate 
deliberatively with governmental actors to shape outcomes in line with the spirit of the 
partnership principle. 
 
(g) Governance: the subsidiarity aspects of decentralised decision-making and the 
partnership-based delivery model are assumed to increase awareness and appreciation of 
the EU. However, there are variations in governance models across and within countries. 
These have a vertical governance dimension, in terms of the balance between national and 
sub-national governance of Cohesion policy, encompassing: highly centralised models with 
single, multi-fund programmes (as in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); decentralised within a 
strong national framework (as in Finland, Sweden); a combination of national and regional 
governance (as in Italy, Poland) to largely regionalised and federal models (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Spain, United Kingdom). There is also a horizontal governance dimension, with 
respect to the degree of coordination within government and the involvement of other 
partners, particularly at sub-national level  local authorities, voluntary bodies, NGOs, 
environmental organisations, economic and social partners and other representatives of 
regional and local civil society.  
 
(h) Implementation: it is crucial to incorporate the interplay with policy implementation 
experiences, both positive and negative, and to consider the implications of different 
implementation models that exist across countries. For example, in some countries/regions, 
the allocation of Structural Funds is subsumed within domestic systems (with co-financing 
at institutional or programme level) and the contribution of EU funding is less visible; in 
others, a separate and specific implementation system for allocating Structural Funds is 
used (with co-financing at project level), giving Cohesion policy a higher political and public 
  
  
 
30 
 
profile (Bachtler et al. 2009). Models of project generation, appraisal and selection (e.g. use 
of strategic projects, restricted calls, open calls for projects) are also influential in 
determining access to programmes and the coverage of spending and awareness of the 
funds.   
 
(i) Territorial diversity: Cohesion policy is implemented in European countries and regions 
with highly different administrative systems, civil participation, development paths, history, 
culture and identity. This diversity has been compounded by EU enlargements over the last 
decade. EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe have had relatively fewer 
opportunities and incentives for interacting with their counterparts in other European 
countries until relatively recently in identity formation terms. 
 
(j) Critical junctures: the succession of economic, migration and political crises affecting the 
EU have had varied impacts across EU Member States and regions with differential 
implications for citizens perceptions of and attitudes to the EU. The degree to which EU 
responses have influenced public perceptions needs to take account of broader, macro-level 
policies (such as stabilisation programmes) as well as the specific role of Cohesion policy as 
part of crisis-response and recovery policies, which varies significantly across and within 
countries (Healey and Bristow 2013). More recently, the UKs referendum on EU 
membership has raised the salience and politicisation of European integration with 
contrasting effects on public opinion and domestic politics across EU Member States 
(Eichhhorn et al. 2016) 
 
3.2 Re se arc h de sign and me thodology  
 
The methodological approach multidisciplinary, theoretically informed, policy-relevant and 
comparative to explore the interplay between: 
x European regions with highly different administrative roles, civil participation, history, 
culture, creativity and identity;  
x the implementation and communication of cohesion policy; and  
x the contribution of Cohesion policy to citizens EU attitudes and identification with the 
European integration project. 
First, a multidisciplinary approach will be adopted to examine these relationships. Conceptual 
insights and techniques from political-science, regional economics, sociological, psychological, 
historical theories and concepts of collective identity formation will be used to provide a 
comprehensive understanding and assessment of the interaction between Cohesion policy and EU 
identification at national and sub-national levels. A pluralist methodological approach will be 
employed to address the research objectives drawing on various quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques (discussed below). 
Second, the methodological approach has been designed to combine theory and practice, reflected 
in the composition of the consortium  with academic experts from a range of countries and 
disciplines as well as SMEs specialising in communication, branding and citizen engagement. This is 
intended to ensure that the empirical research is theoretically informed and academically rigorous 
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in advancing the state of knowledge, as well as delivering conclusions and recommendations that 
are relevant to policy (at different levels) and creative communication practice 
Third, a geographically balanced and comparative set of case studies will be undertaken from 
Member States with different territorial administrative frameworks, levels of economic 
development, intensity of Cohesion policy support and identities in order to identify the channels by 
which European regional policies impact on the perception of Europe by its citizens. The selection 
criteria for case studies include geographical balance, Cohesion policy eligibility and financial 
intensity, programme type, governance system and European identity.  The geographical coverage 
of the research will include the EU28 and a selected number of regional and national (small state) 
case studies within the countries set out in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Country case studies and selection criteria 
MS No. of  
case studies 
Pop. 
(mill) 
Eligibility Funding 
intensity 
Programme  
types 
Governance 
system 
European 
identity 
CY 1 (national) 0.9 MDR Low National Centralised Low 
DE 2 (regions) 80.7 Mainly 
MDR 
Low Regional Federal High 
EL 2 (regions) 10.9 Mixed Med Mainly regional Centralised Low 
HU 1 (national) 9.9 LDR High National Centralised Med 
IE 1 (national) 4.6 MDR Low Mainly regional Centralised Low 
IT 1-2 (regions) 60.8 Mixed Low-
Med 
National & 
regional 
Regionalised Med 
NL 2 regions 16.8 MDR Low Mainly regional Decentralised High 
PL 2 (regions) 38 Mainly 
LDR 
High National & 
regional 
Decentralised Med 
RO 1 (national) 19.9 LDR High National Centralised Med 
SI 1 (national) 2.1 Mixed Med National Centralised Med 
ES 2 (regions) 46.5 Mainly 
MDR 
Low-
Med 
Mainly regional Regionalised High 
UK 2 (regions) 64.3 Mixed Low National and 
regional 
Regionalised Low 
 
Notes: Cohesion policy criteria relate to 2014-20 period; codes for OP architecture: MDR (more-developed regions) and 
LDR (less-developed regions). The European identity measure is based on a Eurobarometer survey question asking 
whether respondents define themselves as European (that is, by one of the following four options: Nationality only, 
nationality and European, European and nationality and European only). The level is determined on the basis fo the 
percentage sum of the last three categories/options (which include a European identity dimension) averaged over 2013-15 
(Annex 1). 
 
Lastly, the case studies will be based on a common and innovative mixed-method design, 
employing a range of quantitative and qualitative techniques that have not previously been used to 
investigate the effects of Cohesion policy on attitudes to the EU (Table 6).  
Statistical analysis of the impact of Cohesion policy financial transfers on European identity will be 
undertaken as well as case studies that are genuinely innovative through mixed-methods designs 
that integrate documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and online surveys, content and framing 
analysis and the first representative survey at regional level of citizens attitudes to Cohesion policy 
and the EU. Content, framing and sentiment analysis techniques will be used to study manifestos 
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and media (traditional and social) commentary on Cohesion policy. The approach is multi-
disciplinary bringing together complementary expertise in political behaviour, regional economics, 
applied policy evaluation, computer science, and media and communication studies.  
 
 
Table 6: Methods, data sources and techniques 
Method Data source Techniques 
Representative surveys of 
citizens in a sample of 
regions/small states 
Original survey administered 
by a specialist company 
Multi-stage random sampling; 
CATI interviewing 
Online surveys of policy elites, 
managers and stakeholders 
Online survey tool Statistical analysis 
In-depth interviews with policy 
elites, managers and 
stakeholders 
Face-to-face and telephone 
interviews 
In-depth semi-structured 
interviews  
Quantitative analysis of 
existing datasets on political 
attitudes, economic variables 
and Cohesion policy 
Eurobarometer, World 
values survey, Eurostat, 
AMECO, DG Regio datasets 
Multivariate statistical 
techniques; multi-level 
modelling; econometrics 
Documentary analysis of 
communication strategies and 
measures 
Programming documents, 
communication strategies 
and evaluations (in-house 
electronic library and 
programme websites) 
Content analysis 
Content analysis of political 
manifestos 
Comparative manifestos 
project (in-house dataset) 
Content analysis 
Data-mining, framing analysis 
and sentiment analysis of 
social and traditional media 
Online material including 
websites, blogs, electronic 
news, social media, Lexis-
nexis database 
Web crawler; language 
processing; sentiment analysis 
tools 
Focus groups with citizens in 
selected regions/countries 
Selection of 6-10 citizens per 
focus group 
Open-ended questions; content 
analysis 
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Annex 1 
 
Table 7: Citizens attachment to country and Europe   
MS Year 
EB 
Survey 
(1) 
Nationality 
only 
(2) 
National 
and 
European 
(3) 
European 
and 
National 
(4) 
European 
only 
(5) 
Total 
More 
European 
than 
National 
(6) 
Total 
More 
National 
than 
European 
Total 
European 
(2+3+4) 
CY 2013 EB 79.3 51% 38% 6% 3% 9% 89% 47% 
CY 2013 EB 80.1 46% 42% 6% 3% 9% 88% 51% 
CY 2014 EB 81.4 52% 42% 4% 1% 5% 94% 47% 
CY 2014 EB 82.3 51% 42% 4% 2% 6% 93% 48% 
CY 2015 EB 83.3 57% 35% 5% 3% 8% 92% 43% 
CY 2015 EB 84.3 56% 36% 4% 2% 6% 92% 42% 
CY 2013-15   52% 39% 5% 2% 7% 91% 46% 
DE 2013 EB 79.3 29% 58% 9% 2% 11% 87% 69% 
DE 2013 EB 80.1 36% 54% 7% 2% 9% 90% 63% 
DE 2014 EB 81.4 27% 59% 10% 2% 12% 86% 71% 
DE 2014 EB 82.3 30% 56% 9% 2% 11% 86% 67% 
DE 2015 EB 83.3 25% 58% 12% 2% 14% 83% 72% 
DE 2015 EB 84.3 30% 58% 7% 2% 9% 88% 67% 
DE 2013-15   30% 57% 9% 2% 11% 87% 68% 
EL 2013 EB 79.3 41% 51% 4% 0% 4% 92% 55% 
EL 2013 EB 80.1 55% 39% 5% 0% 5% 94% 44% 
EL 2014 EB 81.4 49% 47% 3% 1% 4% 96% 51% 
EL 2014 EB 82.3 53% 45% 1% 0% 1% 98% 46% 
EL 2015 EB 83.3 51% 47% 1% 0% 1% 98% 48% 
EL 2015 EB 84.3 48% 50% 1% 0% 1% 98% 51% 
EL 2013-15   50% 47% 3% 0% 3% 96% 49% 
ES 2013 EB 79.3 32% 52% 5% 4% 9% 84% 61% 
ES 2013 EB 80.1 33% 51% 5% 5% 10% 84% 61% 
ES 2014 EB 81.4 27% 56% 5% 5% 10% 83% 66% 
ES 2014 EB 82.3 28% 56% 5% 6% 11% 84% 67% 
ES 2015 EB 83.3 28% 56% 5% 6% 11% 84% 67% 
ES 2015 EB 84.3 28% 57% 7% 3% 10% 85% 67% 
ES 2013-15   29% 55% 5% 5% 10% 84% 65% 
HU 2013 EB 79.3 43% 49% 5% 1% 6% 92% 55% 
HU 2013 EB 80.1 46% 45% 5% 2% 7% 91% 52% 
HU 2014 EB 81.4 46% 44% 8% 2% 10% 90% 54% 
HU 2014 EB 82.3 39% 48% 10% 2% 12% 87% 60% 
HU 2015 EB 83.3 37% 51% 10% 2% 12% 88% 63% 
HU 2015 EB 84.3 33% 56% 9% 1% 10% 89% 66% 
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HU 2013-15   41% 49% 8% 2% 10% 90% 58% 
IE 2013 EB 79.3 53% 31% 5% 7% 12% 84% 43% 
IE 2013 EB 80.1 63% 28% 3% 3% 6% 91% 34% 
IE 2014 EB 81.4 49% 46% 3% 2% 5% 95% 51% 
IE 2014 EB 82.3 47% 48% 3% 1% 4% 95% 52% 
IE 2015 EB 83.3 43% 52% 3% 2% 5% 95% 57% 
IE 2015 EB 84.3 47% 47% 4% 1% 5% 94% 52% 
IE 2013-15   50% 42% 4% 3% 6% 92% 48% 
IT 2013 EB 79.3 29% 53% 10% 4% 14% 82% 67% 
IT 2013 EB 80.1 42% 46% 6% 2% 8% 88% 54% 
IT 2014 EB 81.4 45% 46% 5% 1% 6% 91% 52% 
IT 2014 EB 82.3 44% 49% 5% 1% 6% 93% 55% 
IT 2015 EB 83.3 35% 55% 5% 1% 6% 90% 61% 
IT 2015 EB 84.3 45% 49% 4% 1% 5% 94% 54% 
IT 2013-15   40% 50% 6% 2% 8% 90% 57% 
NL 2013 EB 79.3 34% 55% 9% 1% 10% 89% 65% 
NL 2013 EB 80.1 36% 56% 5% 1% 6% 92% 62% 
NL 2014 EB 81.4 32% 61% 6% 1% 7% 93% 68% 
NL 2014 EB 82.3 29% 61% 6% 2% 8% 90% 69% 
NL 2015 EB 83.3 26% 65% 6% 2% 8% 91% 73% 
NL 2015 EB 84.3 31% 60% 6% 2% 8% 91% 68% 
NL 2013-15   31% 60% 6% 2% 8% 91% 68% 
PL 2013 EB 79.3 33% 56% 8% 2% 10% 89% 66% 
PL 2013 EB 80.1 37% 58% 4% 1% 5% 95% 63% 
PL 2014 EB 81.4 36% 55% 4% 1% 5% 91% 60% 
PL 2014 EB 82.3 36% 56% 4% 2% 6% 92% 62% 
PL 2015 EB 83.3 42% 50% 4% 1% 5% 92% 55% 
PL 2015 EB 84.3 37% 53% 5% 1% 6% 90% 59% 
PL 2013-15   37% 55% 5% 1% 6% 92% 61% 
RO 2013 EB 79.3 41% 32% 7% 7% 14% 73% 46% 
RO 2013 EB 80.1 45% 31% 7% 8% 15% 76% 46% 
RO 2014 EB 81.4 47% 46% 4% 3% 7% 93% 53% 
RO 2014 EB 82.3 38% 53% 4% 2% 6% 91% 59% 
RO 2015 EB 83.3 41% 53% 3% 2% 5% 94% 58% 
RO 2015 EB 84.3 40% 54% 3% 1% 4% 94% 58% 
RO 2013-15   42% 45% 5% 4% 9% 87% 53% 
SI 2013 EB 79.3 39% 48% 6% 3% 9% 87% 57% 
SI 2013 EB 80.1 42% 45% 5% 1% 6% 87% 51% 
SI 2014 EB 81.4 37% 56% 3% 2% 5% 93% 61% 
SI 2014 EB 82.3 39% 55% 4% 1% 5% 94% 60% 
SI 2015 EB 83.3 38% 57% 3% 1% 4% 95% 61% 
SI 2015 EB 84.3 39% 53% 5% 1% 6% 92% 59% 
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SI 2013-15   39% 52% 4% 2% 6% 91% 58% 
UK 2013 EB 79.3 60% 33% 3% 2% 5% 93% 38% 
UK 2013 EB 80.1 63% 29% 3% 1% 4% 92% 33% 
UK 2014 EB 81.4 64% 30% 2% 1% 3% 94% 33% 
UK 2014 EB 82.3 58% 33% 4% 2% 6% 91% 39% 
UK 2015 EB 83.3 64% 31% 2% 1% 3% 95% 34% 
UK 2015 EB 84.3 66% 29% 3% 1% 4% 95% 33% 
UK 2013-15   63% 31% 3% 1% 4% 93% 35% 
EU27 2013 EB 79.3 38% 49% 7% 3% 10% 87% 59% 
EU28 2013 EB 80.1 42% 47% 5% 2% 7% 89% 54% 
EU28 2014 EB 81.4 39% 51% 6% 2% 8% 90% 59% 
EU28 2014 EB 82.3 39% 51% 6% 2% 8% 90% 59% 
EU28 2015 EB 83.3 38% 52% 6% 2% 8% 90% 60% 
EU28 2015 EB 84.3 41% 51% 5% 1% 6% 92% 57% 
EU28 2013-15   40% 50% 6% 2% 8% 90% 58% 
Source: EB survey question: do you see yourself as nationality only, nationality and European, European 
and nationality and European only 
 
 
 
